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ABSTRACT 
Malingering has been the focus of numerous studies in forensic psychology and 
neuropsychology over the last several decades; however, accurate identification of 
malingerers continues to be a primary concern in these fields, particularly in civil 
cases that come with costly consequences for erroneous identification. Many measures 
have been developed over the years to identify individuals attempting to malinger on 
neuropsychological testing; unfortunately, given the vast amount of information 
available on the Internet that compromises the security of these tests, they may be 
particularly vulnerable to attempts to coach, or inform, a potential malingerer on how 
to avoid being detected by these measures. 
A previous study showed that a commonly used measure of effort, the Test of 
Memory Malingering (TOMM), was susceptible to coaching based on information that 
was obtained from the Internet (Kovach, 2018). This finding highlighted the 
importance of identifying ways to either revise existing effort measures or develop 
new measures to be more resistant to coaching attempts. The current study sought to 
examine whether increasing the complexity of the TOMM led to variation in level of 
performance between groups providing differing levels of effort. Participants were 
assigned to one of four conditions: best effort (control), intermediate effort (fatigued 
performance), feigning (simulating symptoms of mild traumatic brain injury [mTBI]), 
and coached feigning (simulating mTBI while trying not to be detected as faking).  
The study addressed three main hypotheses: 1) Participants in the feigning group 
will demonstrate significantly poorer performance on the revised measure than the 
control group, intermediate effort group, and coached feigning group; 2) Participants 
                                                                                                                      
 
in the coached feigning group will show significantly poorer performance on the 
revised measure than the control group; and 3) Participants providing intermediate 
effort will demonstrate significantly poorer performance on the revised measure than 
the control group. 
Results showed that the coached feigning group had the lowest total score on the 
revised measure (M = 27.36), followed by the feigning condition (M = 31.43), the 
intermediate effort condition (M = 36.86), and finally, the control group (M = 41.50). 
A one-way between subjects ANOVA was used to determine if total score on the 
revised TOMM across effort conditions was stasticially significant; results of post-hoc 
tests indicated that participants in the control condition outperformed participants in 
the two feigning conditions, but they did not perform significantly better than those in 
the intermediate effort condition.  
Results of this study showed that including similar distractor items and varying 
the number of response options increased the complexity of the TOMM and led to 
varying levels of performance between groups providing different levels of effort. 
This suggests that increasing the complexity of a measure of effort may be a useful 
strategy for decreasing susceptibility of these measures to coaching attempts; however, 
additional research is needed using various clinical groups with repeated learning and 
recall trials to confirm the potential utility of this strategy in reducing susceptibility to 
coaching. 
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Attempting to exaggerate or feign cognitive impairment in order to obtain 
financial compensation is unfortunately all too common in legal disputes in the civil 
arena (Mittenberg, Patton, Canyock, & Condit, 2002). Although this may be 
unsurprising given the large sums of money that stand to be gained through successful 
feigning of impairment, it remains an important concern that has attracted the attention 
of researchers and clinicians hoping to reduce or solve this problem for decades 
(Wygant & Lareau, 2015). Many measures have been developed to detect 
exaggeration or feigning during neuropsychological testing; however, individuals may 
obtain coaching to try to develop a strategy to avoid detection on these measures. 
Coached malingering can broadly refer to any method intended to provide information 
to individuals seeking to overcome methods to identify malingering. Coaching may be 
provided by an attorney, or it may be obtained by the individual through their own 
means, such as an Internet search on common symptoms of the disorder being feigned 
or how to avoid being detected as faking (Brennan et al., 2009).   
A previous study demonstrated that a popular measure of effort, the Test of 
Memory Malingering (TOMM), may be susceptible to coaching based on information 
obtained from the Internet (Kovach, 2018). This finding highlights the need to create 
new measures, or revise existing effort measures, that are more resistant to coaching 
attempts, especially given the amount of information on the Internet threatening test 
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security (Bauer, & McCaffrey, 2006). One such method to reduce susceptibility to 
coaching might be through increasing test complexity as many popular measures of 
effort rely on a simple detection strategy than may be easily circumvented through 
coaching or instruction. More complex measures that rely more heavily on genuine 
cognitive abilities, such as attention and memory, may create differing levels of 
performance among healthy and impaired individuals, thus requiring a malingerer to 










REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
Malingering is an important problem in neuropsychological evaluation that has 
been the focus of numerous research studies over the past few decades. Malingering 
has been defined as the intentional exaggeration or fabrication of symptoms of injury 
or illness in order to obtain an external reward (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013). In civil cases, this reward is typically monetary compensation, which can run 
into the millions of dollars. In criminal cases, defendants may be seeking a “not guilty 
by reason of insanity” ruling, and in these and other cases may fake symptoms of 
mental disorder to support their claims, argue for mitigating factors, or obtain lesser 
sentences. Thus, the presence of secondary gain, e.g., seeking some type of external 
reward, is often evaluated when undertaking a neuropsychological evaluation 
(Heilbronner et al., 2009).  
Malingering continues to place a significant burden on the legal system, even 
though it has been a highly researched and debated problem in forensic psychology 
and neuropsychology for many years. As important as it is to detect individuals who 
are attempting to feign or exaggerate a disorder, it is perhaps more important to avoid 
falsely identifying someone as malingering when they are not, or to verify true 
disorder. Falsely labeling an individual as a malingerer can result in the loss of needed 
compensation in civil cases or in unjust sentencing outcomes in criminal cases 
(Berthelson, Mulchan, Odland, Miller, & Mittenberg, 2013; Heilbronner et al., 2009). 
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Thus, it is crucial that neuropsychologists, as well as others who may be involved in 
malingering status determinations, make every effort to reach accurate conclusions 
and have the highest quality methods available to assist them.  
Mittenberg et al.’s (2002) study estimated that 29% of personal injury, 30% of 
disability, 19% of criminal, and 8% of medical cases involved probable malingering. 
A review of malingering in medicolegal contexts estimated the base rate of 
malingering in chronic pain patients with secondary gain to be 20 to 50% (Greve, Ord, 
Bianchini, & Curtis, 2009). Although these are merely estimates, they emphasize the 
prevalence of exaggeration and feigning in the legal system. Contributing to the 
serious consequences of malingering is the resulting financial burden. Chafetz and 
Underhill (2011) examined Social Security disability claims for 2011 and estimated 
the cost of malingering for that year to be 20 billion dollars. This signifies a massive 
financial burden, especially given that this estimate only focused on a select portion of 
malingering cases (i.e., Social Security disability claims) for a single year.  
Embedded Effort Measures. Determinations of malingering in psychology and 
neuropsychology are often made through a combination of subjective impressions and 
the use of assessment measures. Numerous measures to detect faking or exaggeration 
on neuropsychological testing have been developed to assist in the identification of 
malingering. Some of these measures are embedded within standard cognitive 
assessment instruments, for example the forced-choice recognition trial on the 
California Verbal Learning Test, Second Edition (CVLT-II; Delis, Kramer, Kaplan, & 
Ober, 2000) or the validity scales on the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, 
Second Edition (MMPI-II; Butcher, Dahlstrom, Graham, Tellegen, & Kaemmer, 
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1989). Embedded measures are often intended as a check on an examinee’s effort or 
reporting style during an evaluation. In cases in which effort or cooperation is an 
especially important concern, such as evaluations for legal cases, it is often advised 
that a neuropsychologist incorporate more than one indicator of effort, including not 
only embedded measures, but at least one standalone test (Heilbronner et al., 2009).  
Standalone Effort Measures. Standalone tests of malingering are designed primarily 
or solely to appraise effort or symptom validity. Many standalone measures of 
malingering have been developed and studied using civil, criminal, psychiatric, and 
cognitively impaired samples. These tests vary in their psychometric properties, with 
some measures, such as the TOMM (Tombaugh, 1996) and the Word Memory Test 
(WMT; Green, Allen, & Astner, 1996) found to demonstrate high levels of sensitivity 
to feigning or exaggeration, often greater than 80%, while maintaining high levels of 
specificity (Green, Lees-Haley, & Allen, 2002; Schroeder et al., 2012). Conversely, 
other effort tests, such as the Rey 15-Item Test (Rey, 1941), have been shown to be 
highly transparent, and thus to have low sensitivity (Strutt, Scott, Shrestha, & York, 
2011).  
Ceiling Effects. Standalone measures of effort are often prone to ceiling effects, which 
is a term used to describe the clustering of too many individuals at a test’s upper limit 
(e.g., making few or no errors). Ceiling effects limit the measurement of variation in 
performance. A relatively high percentage of individuals obtain maximum or near 
maximum scores on effort tests such as the TOMM and the WMT, which stems from 
the main detection strategy these tests employ. The tests are designed to appear more 
difficult than is truly the case in order to detect suboptimal effort, whereas they are 
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actually very easy. Consequently, most individuals providing sufficient effort, even 
those with various psychiatric and cognitive impairments, usually make very few or no 
errors. In contrast, individuals who make considerably more errors than is plausible 
given their purported injury or illness are often identified as providing insufficient 
effort (Green et al., 2002; Schroeder et al., 2012).  
Effort tests with low ceilings generally cannot differentiate between good effort 
and adequate effort. For example, the TOMM can detect very poor effort, but may be 
insensitive to subtle changes or decline in effort (Schroeder et al., 2012). The ability to 
assess degrees of effort during an evaluation could be valuable to neuropsychologists 
practicing in a various settings as it could help determine whether an individual was 
exerting maximal effort, or whether they were simply putting forth just enough effort 
to get through testing, but not performing at or near the best of their abilities.  
This is an especially important determination in cases of ambiguous effort or 
seemingly low motivation. If an individual does not appear to be engaged in testing or 
doing their best, or if they have conflicting or borderline performance on indicators of 
effort, it would be beneficial to evaluate the degree of effort, and not be limited to the 
type of artificial, dichotomous categorizations associated with many current 
malingering tests. If an individual is providing modest effort on testing, but not their 
best effort, then the results obtained during the evaluation may not reflect their true 
level of ability or potential maximal performance (An, Zakzanis, & Joordens, 2012). 
Such distinctions can be especially important whether the results are used to assist in 
legal determinations, or in clinical settings to help design interventions (e.g., 
medication for ADHD, accommodations at work or school, etc.), perform differential 
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diagnosis, or predict outcomes. For example, in a legal case, even a subtle decline in 
cognitive functioning may have a substantial impact on the performance of demanding 
occupational tasks (e.g., flying commercial aircraft). Consequently, differentiating 
between a drop in test scores that reflects true brain dysfunction as opposed to less 
than full effort can change outcomes completely.   
Coached Malingering. The potential for an individual to be coached on testing is 
another factor complicating the assessment of true effort. Coached malingering is a 
term used to describe an individual who obtains information on testing or on the 
symptomology of the injury or illness they are attempting to feign in order to avoid 
detection. These individuals may gather information on their own or be provided with 
information by their attorney or others. A conscientious attorney might warn clients 
about measures neuropsychologists may use to evaluate feigning or exaggeration, and 
which could result in false-positive identifications and potential denial of just 
compensation (Brennan et al., 2009). Worries about expert bias or selection of faulty 
measures might feed such concerns and action steps. Similarly, truly injured 
individuals may seek out coaching given concerns they will not be compensated fairly 
by a legal system they perceive as potentially biased or flawed. Hence, such 
individuals may be injured and exaggerating their level of dysfunction. Nevertheless, 
whether an injury is totally fabricated or is exaggerated to a degree, it certainly can be 
argued that it is beneficial to identify whether, or the extent to which, claims are 
falsified.    
Most studies on coached malingering have found many effort measures to be 
largely resistant to the effects of coaching; however, these studies are prone to 
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methodological errors or shortcomings. In one such study, the participants who were 
instructed to malinger were provided with coaching instructions for the Validity 
Indicator Profile (VIP), but then administered the TOMM, which relies on a 
completely different strategy to detect malingering (Powell, Gfeller, Hendricks, & 
Sharland, 2004). A recent study created a set of coaching instructions designed to 
reflect the amount of information on a malingering measure readily available on the 
Internet (Kovach, 2018). In this study, using specific coaching instructions developed 
based on a brief Internet search on the TOMM, every participant in the specific 
coaching group was able to identify and pass the TOMM on testing. In addition, all 
participants in this group performed poorly on at least one of the genuine cognitive 
tests, thus reflecting their ability to follow the instructions to feign dysfunction while 
avoiding detection on a measure of effort. The results of this study contradicted 
previous literature on coached malingering by showing that information that could be 
obtained during a brief Internet search was sufficient to successfully malinger while 
avoiding detection on the TOMM.  
Although the aforementioned study only examined the effects of coaching using 
information from the Internet on one test of effort, it is likely that other effort tests, 
especially those using a similar strategy as the TOMM, may be compromised by 
obtaining information available on the Internet or through other sources. Several effort 
tests including the TOMM, the Dot Counting Test (DCT), and the WMT are designed 
to look harder than they actually are, which allows for easy detection of naïve 
malingerers who have no familiarity with the test or its underlying detection strategy. 
However, an individual may well avoid detection if they are familiar with the test 
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design: they only need to provide adequate effort to avoid being caught. With the rise 
of accessibility to the Internet, a potential malingerer may only require a matter of 
minutes to obtain sufficient information (coaching) to pass these measures. 
Researchers have shown that the security of several effort measures, including the 
TOMM, the WMT, and the Victoria Symptom Validity Test has been compromised by 
various websites (Bauer & McCaffrey, 2006; Ruiz, Drake, Glass, Marcotte, & van 
Gorp, 2002). It is all but impossible to limit the accessibility to information about 
effort tests on the Internet; thus, further avenues to make tests more resilient to 
coaching need to be explored. 
Complexity of Effort Tests. Increasing the complexity of effort tests is one possible 
way to increase a measure’s resistance to coaching. As previously mentioned, several 
measures of effort are prone to ceiling effects, which make them poor or limited 
indicators of degrees of effort. Effort tests that are designed to be more complex may 
result in producing differing levels of performance depending on an individual’s level 
of effort. For example, an individual, healthy or not, who is fatigued, bored, or 
otherwise not engaged in testing will generally perform at a lower level than 
individuals maintaining good effort throughout the process. Whether intentional or 
not, it is important to identify suboptimal levels of effort because variations in effort 
during a neuropsychological battery can affect performance on genuine cognitive tests 
and lead to erroneous conclusions (An et al., 2012).  
Test designs aimed at increasing the complexity of effort tests have improved test 
sensitivity to varying degrees. For example, attempts to reduce the transparency of the 
Rey 15-Item Test by increasing the perception of task difficulty have been largely 
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unsuccessful in increasing sensitivity to levels comparable with other standalone 
measures of effort (Strutt et al., 2011). To illustrate, Boone, Salazar, Lu, Warner-
Chacon, and Razani (2002) attempted to improve the sensitivity of the Rey 15-Item 
Test by adding a recognition trial after the free recall trial. The additional trial did 
increase sensitivity significantly, but not to the level other commonly used measures 
of effort typically achieve.  
The WMT is an effort measure designed to be more complex than previous effort 
tests (Green et al., 1996). This test assesses an individual’s ability to learn 20-word 
pairs (e.g., dog-cat) presented either orally or on a computer. Immediate and delayed 
paired recall trials present options of word pairs (e.g., cat-rabbit), are intended to 
measure effort, and often seem to demonstrate high levels of sensitivity (Batt, Shores, 
& Chekaluk, 2008; Green et al., 2002). 
The WMT includes four different tasks that vary in difficulty, thereby reducing 
the measure’s transparency, and expanding appraisal beyond just effort alone to also 
capture aspects of verbal memory capacities. Few studies have assessed the utility of 
the WMT as a measure of verbal memory apart from its use as an effort test, though 
one study demonstrated differences in level of performance across the four memory 
subtests between cognitively healthy controls and brain injured patients (Green et al., 
2002). Although Green and colleagues were successful in designing a measure of 
effort and memory with subtests that vary in difficulty, some studies have shown poor 
specificity rates for the WMT (Batt et al., 2008; Greve, Ord, Curtis, Bianchini, & 
Brennan, 2008).  
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Number of Response Options. There is often agreement across studies assessing the 
optimal number of response options on multiple choice tests that having three 
response options is ideal. Reducing the number of options from four or five to three 
reduces item difficulty and increases item discrimination (Haladyna, Downing, & 
Rodriguez, 2002; Rodriguez, 2005; Vyas & Supe, 2008). However, further reducing 
the number of response options from four or five down to two significantly reduced 
item difficulty as well as reliability of the item and was not advised among many of 
the authors of these studies; as previously stated, three response options was 
recommended across most studies (Rodriguez, 2005).  
Although varying the number of response options will not impact the difficulty of 
the item for individuals who have the background knowledge to correctly answer the 
question, adding more response options decreases the probability that someone who 
has incomplete knowledge or does not know the right answer, all else being equal, will 
select the correct answer. With a two-choice response option, the odds of correctly 
guessing the answer are 50%, but these odds drop to 25% when faced with a four-
choice response option. Without varying the difficulty of the question, someone who 
is randomly guessing will get more questions right with two-choice response options 
than with three- or four-choice response options (Baek & Wojcieszak, 2009). 
Random Order of Item Difficulty. Randomizing the order of item difficulty may 
make it more challenging for a potential malingerer to monitor their performance 
during the test. Many tests with items at varying levels of difficulty begin with easy 
items and become progressively harder. Cognitive or achievement tests are often 
designed this way so that an individual’s confidence will improve after successfully 
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answering easy items before they get to more challenging items (Skinner, 1999). This 
design is also efficient as discontinuation criteria can be set so that once an individual 
fails several items in a row, they are not administered more difficult items that they 
would likely miss, to decrease testing time and potential frustration. Although having 
items increase in complexity progressively may be an effective test design for 
individuals providing good effort, individuals who are not engaged in testing may give 
up when faced with challenging items and respond randomly. Similarly, individuals 
attempting to feign impairment may intentionally fail harder items to give the 
appearance of cognitive deficits (Frederick, 2002).  
Several studies have found that varying item difficulty on cognitive testing in a 
non-progressive manner does not impact the performance of healthy individuals 
significantly (Skinner, 1999), although most of these studies utilize healthy, 
cognitively normal samples. Few studies have attempted to examine the performance 
of individuals who are attempting to provide insufficient effort; based on a review of 
the literature, these studies are exclusively focused on the VIP (Frederick & Crosby, 
2000, Frederick, Crosby, & Wynkoop, 2000). 
The VIP (Frederick & Crosby, 2000) is a measure of effort that was designed to 
have a hierarchy of item difficulty that is randomized throughout the test. Items for the 
nonverbal section of the measure were modified from the Test of Nonverbal 
Intelligence (TONI; Brown, Sherbenou, & Johnsen, 1982), whereas the test developer 
created the items on the verbal section. Given random ordering, it is cognitively 
challenging for a potential malingerer to select a level at which to start failing items 
that comports systematically with level of item difficulty (Frederick et al., 2000; 
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Frederick, 2002). The test generates a score profile that is analyzed for markers of 
valid versus invalid performance patterns; invalid patterns include careless or 
irrelevant responding and malingering. A malingering performance curve would show 
lower than chance (50%) accuracy for the easy items, and then rise to 50% as items 
increase in difficulty and malingerers can no longer intentionally get questions wrong, 
but rather have to guess (Frederick & Crosby, 2000). Although the VIP has proven to 
be useful in identifying insufficient effort, it is limited in its ability to accurately 
classify intentional underperforming from other types of invalid profiles; it has 
varying levels of acceptable to poor sensitivity for identifying malingering (73.5% for 
nonverbal section and 67.3% for the verbal section; Frederick, 2002).  
The premise of increasing the complexity of an effort test, especially in a manner 
that is difficult to track for the test taker, is potentially useful for reducing 
susceptibility to coaching. In addition, if overly simple malingering measures such as 
the Rey 15-Item Test are highly transparent as a test to detect effort, more complex 
tests of effort may have lower transparency given the inclusion of genuinely 
challenging items. Randomly distributing item difficulty would require potential 
malingerers to develop a sophisticated strategy in which they keep track of their 
performance on items of varying difficulty. Failing easy items at or below chance 
level indicates some degree of random or careless responding or intentional 
underperforming. Therefore, a potential malingerer would need to get enough easy 
items right to avoid raising suspicion. At the same time, getting too many items right 
may categorize their performance as cognitively normal (or above expectations for the 
type or level of impairment at issue), and thus undermine attempts to feign 
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dysfunction. Utilizing a hierarchy of item difficulty randomized throughout the test 
may hold promise for making current measures more resistant to coaching.  
The proposed study included four participant groups with varying levels of effort: 
controls (best effort), intermediate effort, feigning, and coached feigning. All 
participant groups were administered a measure of effort that was revised to reduce 
susceptibility to coaching attempts. As this was a preliminary examination of revisions 
to this measure, initial analyses were primarily aimed at testing the impact of these 
changes on group performance. This study sought to test the following hypotheses: 1) 
Participants in the feigning group will have significantly poorer performance on the 
revised measure than the control group, intermediate effort group, and coached 
feigning group; 2) Participants in the coached feigning group will have significantly 
poorer performance on the revised measure than the control group; and 3) Participants 
providing intermediate effort will have significantly poorer performance on the 
revised measure than the control group. 







Participants. The study was advertised to University of Rhode Island 
undergraduate students in psychology and related fields, primarily those enrolled in 
introductory psychology courses. Students in many of these courses are encouraged to 
participate in research for extra credit. Fifty-six participants from undergraduate 
classes volunteered to participate in the study. One participant misunderstood the 
demands of the study and showed up to participate two weeks in a row; as soon as this 
mistake was detected by the research assistant running the participant, the participant’s 
second set of data was removed from the final dataset to ensure independence of 
observations.  
 The final sample size included in the analyses was 56. Most participants (n = 
49) were between the ages of 18 and 21, with 6 participants between the ages of 22 
and 26; 1 participant did not report their age. The majority of participants identified as 
white (n = 40), with 5 identifying as black, 7 as Hispanic, 2 as Asian, 1 as multiracial, 
and 1 as other. Thirty-three participants identified as female, 19 identified as male, and 
2 identified as non-binary; 2 participants did not report their gender. 
Procedures. The current study sought to assess whether increasing the 
complexity of a popular measure of malingering led to variation in level of 
performance between groups providing optimal effort and differing levels of 
suboptimal effort. This was an experimental study with one independent variable, 
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level of effort, which had four levels: best effort (control), intermediate effort (e.g., 
fatigued performance), feigning (simulating symptoms of mild traumatic brain injury 
[mTBI]), and coached feigning (simulating mTBI while trying not to be detected as 
faking). The group of controls was instructed to provide their best effort on the test. 
The group providing intermediate effort was asked to take the test as if they were very 
tired after a long day of work or classes. The feigning group received instructions to 
fake symptoms of mTBI while taking the test; they were provided with common 
symptoms of mTBI, e.g., headaches and difficulty concentrating. The coached 
feigning group received instructions that were similar to the feigning group, but in 
addition they were coached on the purpose of the measure and instructed to perform 
less than their best, but not to an extent that was so obvious they would be detected as 
faking (Appendix A). Participants were randomly assigned to conditions prior to the 
start of testing.  
Participants were tested individually in a quiet room on campus by one of three 
undergraduate research assistants. All three research assistants were blind to the study 
hypotheses, that is, they were not informed about which groups were predicted to 
perform better or worse on the revised measure. Upon arriving for the study, 
participants were given a consent form explaining their rights as a research participant 
(e.g., their right to refuse to participate or leave at any point). Consent forms were 
stored separately from participants’ test data and questionnaires to ensure anonymity. 
Participants were administered a revised version of the TOMM followed by a brief 
questionnaire (Appendix B).  
                                                                                                                      
17 
 
 The G-Power 3.1 computer program (Faul, 2009) was used to conduct an a 
priori power analysis. When reported in the literature, malingering studies typically 
yield large effect sizes due to extreme differences in scores between malingering and 
genuinely responding participants. Thus, most malingering studies can be sufficiently 
powered using relatively small samples. As it was not known how groups would 
perform on the revised measure prior to conducting the study, the effect size had to be 
estimated; the estimated effect size was set at a relatively conservative level of 0.50, 
which is significantly smaller than effect sizes obtained in many previous malingering 
studies, including Kovach’s (2018) previous study, which yielded a very large effect 
size of  (f = 1.32). Using a power level of .80, the estimated total sample size needed 
to detect an effect size of this magnitude was 48 participants. A post-hoc power 
analysis revealed a large effect size (f = 0.90) and an observed power level of 0.99, 
indicating that this study was sufficiently powered. 
Measure. The Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM; Tombaugh, 1996) is a 50-
item visual recognition test that was developed to distinguish poor effort from 
adequate effort. The TOMM has two learning trials, administered one right after the 
other, and an optional retention trial presented after a brief delay. Examinees are 
shown 50 pictures of common objects, presented one after another. After the set is 
completed, examinees are shown a series of 50 two-choice recognition items: one 
answer choice is a previously shown item and the other answer choice is an item that 
was not (Tombaugh, 1996). Validation studies on the TOMM have found high levels 
of sensitivity and specificity in distinguishing genuine responders from malingerers 
using the cut-off score for performance on Trial 2 that is recommended in the test 
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manual (Haber & Fichtenberg, 2006; Wisdom, Brown, Chen, & Collins, 2012). 
Studies have also demonstrated that the TOMM is relatively insensitive to the effects 
of age, education, and various types of cognitive and psychiatric disorders (Haber & 
Fichtenberg, 2006; Rees, Tombaugh, Gansler, & Moczynski, 1998).  
A recent study showed that the TOMM was susceptible to coaching using 
information obtained from a brief Internet search (Kovach, 2018). The current study 
sought to revise the instrument by increasing its complexity and making it more 
difficult for potential malingerers to track their performance throughout the measure. 
One revision was to incorporate more response options; instead of relying on two-
choice answer options, three- and four-choice answer options were introduced. A 
second revision was to vary details of the target item to create a similar but different 
distractor item. In the standard version of the TOMM, the distractor items are vastly 
different from the target items. For example, if the target item is a picture of a teddy 
bear, the distractor item is a completely unrelated object, such as a flower.  
The previously described strategy of slightly altering target and distractor items is 
utilized in the Shape Learning Trials of the Neuropsychological Assessment Battery 
(NAB; Stern & White, 2003), a measure of visual learning and memory. Research 
suggests that the Shape Learning Trials of the NAB are sensitive to severity of 
traumatic brain injury and that brain injured individuals perform significantly worse 
than healthy individuals (Donders & Levitt, 2012). Thus, utilizing a similar design of 
slightly varying distractor items from target items on the TOMM, at least for select 
items, was predicted to increase item difficulty and thereby provide one potential 
means for assessing degree of effort as opposed to limiting judgments or 
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classifications into binary categories. It is important to note that increasing the 
difficulty of items will place more demand on genuine cognitive abilities, such as 
attention and visual memory, than the original version of the TOMM. This is similar 
to the WMT, which serves primarily as a measure of effort, but includes additional, 
more difficult, trials that assess verbal memory ability.  
Randomizing the order of items introduced a third dimension that potential 
malingerers had to track, which was intended to make the TOMM more resistant to 
coaching attempts. Given the limits of human cognition and working memory capacity 
(7 units plus or minus 2 for unidimensional variables according to Miller’s classic 
(1954) article), adding these additional dimensions to a task would likely create 
extreme or excessive mental load. A person’s performance on a given task is a 
reflection of the mental load of the task and the mental effort, or cognitive capacity, 
the person is able to exert (Kirschner, 2002). Thus, on the revised measure, a 
malingerer would have to keep track of three varying dimensions of complexity while 
attempting to perform in a manner consistent with individuals who have the genuine 
illness or injury they are purporting to have, a task which seemingly exceeds the 
limitations of human cognition for a very large percentage of the population.  
Varying the order and level of complexity (e.g. two-, three-, and four-choice 
answer options) of items not only adds to the mental load of the measure, but also 
allows a neuropsychologist to evaluate the pattern of performance for inconsistencies 
or suspicious responding. For example, if an individual is missing several easy items 
(e.g., items in which the distractors are very dissimilar from the target), but correctly 
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answering more challenging items at a similar or greater rate, it could signal 
intentional underperforming. 
The proposed measure maintained the two sample items from the original version 
of the TOMM, followed by the presentation of the same 50 stimulus items for three 
seconds each, in accordance with standard TOMM administration procedures. As also 
accords with standard TOMM procedures, 50 forced-choice recognition questions 
were presented next, although with modifications made in the content of most of these 
items. Six of these 50 questions were maintained in their original form (two-choice 
answer options that included a markedly dissimilar distracter option). Among the 
items that remained, 14 items contained markedly dissimilar distractor options in 
accord with the original TOMM format, but seven of these items were modified from 
two-choice to three-choice answer options, and the other seven items from two-choice 
to four-choice answer options. The 30 additional items contained one distractor option 
that was similar to the target item (e.g., a shaded flower versus an unshaded flower); 
ten of these items were two-choice answers, ten were three-choice answers, and ten 
were four-choice items. Items were randomly ordered throughout the recognition 
section with the intention of making it more difficult for potential malingerers to keep 
track of their performance throughout the test. 
This was an initial study designed to examine the revised measure’s potential 
effectiveness in detecting coached malingerers. Only one trial of the test was 
administered to perform a critical check on whether manipulating difficulty across 
multiple dimensions would change performance characteristics, with an initial focus 
on accuracy across different conditions. The long-term, programmatic interest is to use 
                                                                                                                      
21 
 
the current research to examine the impact of modifications to the measure, to make 
revisions and adjustments to this or other measures as needed, and to then conduct 
subsequent studies to test effectiveness in evaluating effort among various groups (i.e., 
individuals with TBI, depression, and other neurologic and psychiatric disorders).  







Statistical Analyses. Preliminary analyses were conducted using SPSS version 
25 (IBM Corp., 2017). Group comparisons indicated that demographic variables (i.e., 
age, race/ethnicity, sex) were similarly distributed across effort conditions (see Table 
1). Statistical assumptions of analysis of variance (ANOVA) were examined, 
including independence of cases, normality, and homogeneity of variance. No 
assumptions were violated. 
Table 2 provides the mean total score for the revised TOMM for all four 
conditions. The control group had the highest score (M = 41.50, SD = 3.35), followed 
by the intermediate effort condition (M = 36.86, SD = 5.53), and then the feigning 
condition (M = 31.43, SD = 7.82). The coached feigning group had the lowest mean 
score out of all conditions (M = 27.36, SD = 7.18), indicating that they had the poorest 
performance and made the most errors on the revised measure out of all the groups. 
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 were initially examined using a one-way between subjects 
ANOVA to determine if total score on the revised TOMM differed significantly across 
effort conditions. Table 3 presents these results, which reveal that scores differed 
significantly between effort conditions (F(3,52) = 13.88, p < .001). In order to 
determine which groups performed significantly different on the revised measure from 
one another; Tukey post-hoc tests were examined. The control condition was found to 
be significantly different at the p <.05 level from the feigning and coached feigning 
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conditions, and the intermediate effort condition was found to be significantly 
different from the coached feigning condition; all other conditions were not 
significantly different from one another (see Table 4).  
Results of post-hoc tests indicate that participants in the control condition 
outperformed participants in the two feigning conditions, but they did not perform 
significantly better than those in the intermediate effort group. Although participants 
in the intermediate effort condition outperformed those in the coached feigning group, 
which had the lowest performance, they did not have significantly different 
performance from either the control group or feigning condition. This indicates that 
there was less clear delineation between groups demonstrating best effort, intermediate 
effort, and impaired effort as compared to the original version of the TOMM.  
Eta-squared was calculated to determine effect size for the ANOVA. Cohen’s 
(1988) benchmarks were used to interpret eta-squared; results indicated that there was 
a large effect size for effort condition on the revised TOMM (η2= 0.45). This finding 
indicates that 45% of the variance in revised TOMM performance was attributable to 
effort condition. The results suggest that the level of effort participants put into their 
performance on the revised TOMM accounted for a large amount of the variance in 
total score on the revised measure.  
Additional exploratory analyses were conducted to determine whether the number 
and type of errors made on items varied by effort condition (see Table 5). Results of 
these analyses showed that participants tended to make far more errors on questions 
with similar distractor items compared to items with dissimilar distractors. The type of 
response option with the lowest mean number of errors was the two-choice, dissimilar 
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distractor items (M = 5.7), which were the six items taken directly from the original 
version of the TOMM and not altered in any way. When participants were given three- 
and four-choice response options instead of only two, they were more likely to make 
errors. The highest mean number of errors were made on three-choice (M = 22.7) and 
four-choice response option items (M = 25.7) with similar distractors.  
Although asking participants to intentionally feign impaired performance could 
partially account for the large number of errors made on the revised measure, even 
participants in the control group missed several items. Of note, controls tended to 
answer items with similar distractors incorrectly, yet missed very few items with 
dissimilar distractors, indicating that the items with similar distractors were more 
difficult than items containing only dissimilar distractors. Table 6 shows the error 
analysis of an item that was revised to be a four-choice response option with a similar 
distractor and two dissimilar distractors. Results of this analysis indicate that none of 
the controls selected the dissimilar distractors; however, some participants in the other 
conditions did select the dissimilar distractors as their answer.  
Participants’ responses on the follow-up questionnaire indicated that most rated 
the instructions they received as very clear, with mean group ratings ranging from 1.14 
(feigning group) to 1.86 (coached feigning group) on a 7-point scale with lower scores 
indicating greater clarity and higher scores indicating little to no clarity. In addition, 
participants had approximately equal ratings of test difficulty and success at following 
instructions across conditions; however, the control condition rated their perceived 
success more highly than the other conditions (M = 6.29), which is likely due to the 
simplicity of their instructions (see Table 7). 








Determination of malingering can be an onerous task that carries a significant 
financial and personal burden if a misclassification occurs in either direction, i.e., 
someone who is genuinely injured being labeled as a malingerer and losing out on 
much needed financial assistance, or conversely, someone who is fabricating injury 
winning a large damage award and obligating a party to payment that may far exceed 
what is warranted. Although there may be little sympathy felt towards large corporate 
entities paying damage awards, these payments are often passed on to consumers, and 
beyond that, the person blamed for causing the (pseudo) injury may feel deep personal 
remorse about the seeming harm they inflicted on another person.     
Accurate classification of malingerers has received considerable attention in the 
field of neuropsychology over the years (Heilbronner et al., 2009; Van Oorsouw & 
Merckelbach, 2010; Young, Jacobson, Einzig, Gray, & Gudjonsson, 2016), with much 
progress having been made in the field. However, problems and critical concerns 
remain. One such central and potentially vexing problem is identifying malingerers 
who have been coached on how to pass measures designed to detect faking, especially 
given the ever-increasing ease with which individuals can obtain information about 
measures of effort and symptom validity using the Internet (Bauer & McCaffrey, 
2006; Ruiz et al., 2002). 




Kovach’s (2018) study showed the susceptibility of a measure of effort to 
coaching attempts using information available on the Internet. In that study, 
participants in one condition were given a warning about a measure designed to detect 
feigning and a brief description of the measure’s detection strategy. This minimal 
coaching allowed all participants in that condition to avoid detection on this effort test. 
In addition, they were able to distinguish the measure from genuine memory tests and 
selectively underperform on the latter, thereby creating a result suggesting good effort 
and genuine memory deficit. The results of that study demonstrated the ease with 
which information available on the Internet regarding neuropsychological evaluations 
and commonly used measures can be used to successfully develop an effective 
coaching strategy, a result unlikely to be isolated to a single malingering test. The 
current dissertation served as a follow-up to a previous study by attempting to make a 
popular measure of effort more resistant to coaching attempts. 
Results of the current study partially supported the first hypothesis; participants in 
the feigning group (M = 31.43) had significantly poorer performance on the revised 
measure than the control group (M = 41.50). However, they did not have significantly 
different performance from the intermediate effort (M = 36.86) or coached feigning 
groups (M = 27.36). This indicated that participants in the uncoached feigning 
condition performed well below the level of controls, but not significantly worse than 
participants exerting intermediate effort and those who were coached on the measure. 
This suggests that the revised measure cannot as easily distinguish between adequate 
effort, naïve feigning, and coached feigning. The original version of the TOMM 
effectively distinguished between adequate effort and intentional feigning using a 




cutoff score for total correct on Trial 2 and the retention trial. However, only one 
recall trial was used in this study, so it is not possible to assess whether a similarly set 
cutoff point would maintain its effectiveness on the revised measure. Although the 
results suggest it may be more difficult to differentiate between effort levels using a 
single cutoff score, this would need to be tested in future studies using the full three 
recall trials of the measure. 
The second hypothesis of the study was supported; participants who were 
coached on how to feign and given a warning to avoid being detected by the measure 
performed significantly worse than the control group. In contrast to the results of 
Kovach’s (2018) study the coached feigners had significantly poorer performance 
compared to controls as well as an intermediate effort group. This suggests that either 
the coaching instructions provided to the participants were not sufficient to help them 
develop a strategy to avoid detection or that the revised measure was more resistant to 
coaching attempts given the increased complexity. In the previous study, coached 
participants were told that making more than a few errors was highly unusual even 
among genuinely injured individuals. However, coached participants in this study did 
not receive such explicit directions regarding number of errors as the average number 
of errors among healthy controls was not yet known.  
The coached feigning group was instructed to do less than their best but not 
perform so poorly as to make it obvious they were underperforming, their mean total 
score was the lowest out of all four groups, though only significantly worse than the 
coached and intermediate groups. Their very poor performance may have been due to 
a lack of explicit coaching instructions that prevented this group from developing an 




effective coaching strategy to “pass” the measure and the instructions may have been 
too vague to sufficiently coach participants to avoid detection. Future studies should 
test a new coached feigning group that can be explicitly coached using information 
regarding the average performance of controls in this study to determine whether the 
measure remains resistant to more specific coaching attempts or not.  
In addition, future studies could identify a sample of “skilled malingerers”, 
participants who are able to avoid detection on various measures of effort, including 
the original version of the TOMM. These participants could then be explicitly coached 
on this revised measure to see if they are can avoid detection, even given detailed 
information about the measure and the detection strategies being employed. As 
previously mentioned, the three revisions to this measure create three dimensions of 
complexity, which seemingly exceeds the limit of human cognitive capacity. Thus, it 
would be expected even with the most explicit coaching possible, a potential 
malingerer would not be able to simultaneously track all three dimensions to 
successfully develop a strategy that mirrors the performance of those who have 
genuine injury or illness. 
Finally, the third hypothesis of the study was not supported; participants who 
were instructed to provide an intermediate level of effort did not have significantly 
poorer performance on this measure compared to controls. Although the intermediate 
group had a lower mean total score than controls, this difference did not reach 
statistical significance. This suggests that participants providing less than their best 
effort made more errors compared to controls, but not so many as to perform 
significantly worse.  




One reason the third hypothesis might not have been supported in the current 
study is due to uncertainty among participants on how to follow the intermediate effort 
instructions. Although most participants rated the instructions they were given as 
clear, participants might have experienced confusion over how to translate feeling 
fatigued into test performance. Some participants may have already been tired at the 
time of testing and decided to perform the best they could given their already fatigued 
state, whereas other participants may have intentionally tried to underperform and 
make more errors than they would have if they were doing their best. Subsequent 
studies should consider including items on the questionnaire to assess an individual’s 
level of fatigue prior to testing as well as open-ended questions to gather information 
about how they approached the task to control for differences in performance strategy. 
Future studies should attempt to recruit a real-life intermediate effort condition to 
determine how individuals not instructed to perform less than their best, but who for 
various reasons may not be able to provide maximal effort at the time of testing, 
perform on this revised measure. 
The results of this study indicated that there may be some ability to determine 
degrees of effort using the revised measure because the binary classification of 
acceptable versus poor effort no longer holds up with these groups. It is likely that the 
intermediate effort group would have passed the original TOMM while exerting the 
same level of effort due to the minimal cognitive demands of the task; however, on 
this revised measure, they are not easily distinguishable from either the controls or the 
feigning group, indicating that the more complex measure results in less clear 
delineation between groups.  




The types of errors made on a single item was briefly explored in Table 6; 
however, further analysis on the average number and type of errors made (e.g., 
number of errors made on items with similar versus dissimilar distractors) between 
various groups should be examined in subsequent studies as a potential method of 
effort classification. Using number of errors made on items with dissimilar distractors 
may be a more effective classification method between groups rather than a cutoff 
score for total number of errors made. Utilizing error analysis as a method of 
classification may also help to ensure the measure is truly classifying degree of effort 
rather than degree of impairment; that is, analyzing the types of errors made may 
prevent false positive identifications of poor effort being made among individuals who 
are attempting to provide their best effort but who cannot perform as well as healthy 
controls due to genuine injury or illness.  
On the original version of the TOMM, individuals with genuine illness and injury 
perform similarly to controls, allowing the measure to easily screen out anyone 
performing so poorly it is likely only attributable to low effort. On the revised version, 
there seems to be greater variation in performance between best effort, diminished 
effort, and feigned impairment as evidenced by the wide range of scores obtained 
between groups and the overlap of these ranges between groups (i.e., lowest score 
obtained by a control was 36, the highest scores in the two feigning groups were 40 
and 41). A brief analysis of the type of errors made on a single item indicated there 
may be a way to further analyze differences in performance between groups as a way 
to classify effort rather than a single cutoff score classifying effort as either good or 
poor. As mentioned in the introduction, the ability to determine degrees of effort can 




be very useful to neuropsychologists practicing in a variety of settings, not only in the 
forensic realm, as it allows them to determine if an individual is putting forth maximal 
effort, if they are providing adequate effort but not doing their best, or if they are 
displaying poor effort or potentially malingering. 
An exploratory analysis across conditions revealed that participants had much 
higher rates of error on items with similar distractors. This was especially important in 
the control condition, as healthy controls on the original version of the TOMM made 
very few, if any, errors. On the revised measure, controls made very few errors on 
items with dissimilar distractors, but missed several items containing similar 
distractors. This suggests that changing the similarity of distractor items to more 
closely resemble target items was successful in increasing the difficulty of those items.  
Varying the number of response options did not have as noticeable of an effect on 
the difficulty of the measure, as participants had approximately equal rates of errors 
among two-, three-, and four-choice response options; however, these differences were 
not tested for statistical significance and adding more response options might have a 
significant effect on the measure’s complexity. The items with the least amount of 
errors were the dissimilar, two-choice response options, which were the items taken 
directly from the original version of the TOMM. This is not surprising given the low 
number of errors made by healthy controls and various clinical groups on the original 
TOMM. The finding of increased number of errors made on other types of items (i.e., 
ones with similar distractors) indicate that the revisions made to the TOMM 
successfully increased the difficulty of the measure. 




A follow-up study will examine the individual items on the revised measure in 
greater detail, for example, by formally examining the difficulty of each item. In 
addition, internal consistency will be analyzed to determine if participants within each 
group are performing similarly across items. Some items may be further revised or 
altered to change their difficulty level based on the results of these analyses. For 
example, an item that most participants are answering incorrectly might be revised to 
make it slightly less difficult. Such analyses were not included in the current study 
given the primary intent of determining whether the revisions made to the TOMM led 
to varying levels of performance across groups. In-depth item analysis and fine-tuning 
of the measure will be the next step in this program of research. 
There are several strengths and limitations to this study. One strength was 
including a participant group to simulate an intermediate level of effort; most effort 
measures only discriminate between good/adequate levels of effort and very poor or 
below chance levels of effort, and one goal for this study was to be able to assess 
degrees of effort beyond the binary good versus poor effort. Participants attempted to 
provide less than maximal effort without intentionally trying to feign impaired 
performance, which allowed for examination of a potential difference in overall 
performance compared to groups providing good or poor effort. Although the 
intermediate group did not perform significantly worse than the control group, they 
did, on average, have poorer performance and made more errors. Another strength of 
the study was having research assistants who were blind to the hypotheses of the 
study, so as not to unintentionally bias their interaction with participants. 




One limitation in the current study was only testing one recall trial of the revised 
measure, which prevented the researcher from assessing whether performance would 
improve in subsequent trials after participants were aware of the attention and visual 
memory demands of the study. Participants in the control group made significantly 
more errors on this revised measure compared to the performance of healthy controls 
on the original version of the TOMM; however, because only one trial was 
administered, the researcher was not able to determine if controls (as well as other 
participant groups) would adopt a better strategy for remembering target items and 
make fewer errors on subsequent trials.    
The current study permits one to draw only limited inferences about external 
validity due to the demographics of the participant sample being predominantly 
young, white, and female. Although this may be representative of psychology courses 
at the university, it is likely not reflective of the population of individuals who 
malinger in real life. This study is also limited in external validity as it did not include 
a sample of participants with genuine TBI to see how they would perform on this 
measure. Future studies should replicate and expand this study with more diverse 
samples who more accurately represent the demographics of populations involved in 
litigation and who may well have an incentive to malinger.  
Moving forward, it is critical that these initial or subsequent findings be cross-
validated with various multicultural populations. A variety of multicultural groups, in 
particular racially and ethnically minoritized groups, might well be at increased risk 
for overidentification of malingering given a number of factors, such as the long 
history of findings indicating overpathologizing among such individuals (Faust, 




Ahern, Bridges, & Yonce, 2012). Alternatively, in some cases, false-negative errors 
might be increased, leading members of marginalized groups to be mislabeled as 
cognitively normal versus genuinely injured, and consequently missing out on much 
needed compensation or other benefits. In any case, knowing more about 
generalization to diverse groups would be a welcome development and obviously 
superior to speculation.  In this particular case, it is imperative that the types of 
revisions to the TOMM being developed and examined here be tested with various 
multicultural groups to determine efficacy and the potential need for modifications in 
measurement or interpretation.    
Another limitation of the study was the use of an original questionnaire that was 
developed to collect information about the revised measure. This questionnaire was 
developed due to the lack of existing measures that would adequately assess the 
questions the researcher was most interested in addressing; however, the use of an 
original, non-validated questionnaire could lead to errors in assessing constructs of 
interest due to poorly worded questions or a range of other psychometric 
shortcomings.  
The results of this study show that including similar distractor items and varying 
the number of response options increased the difficulty of the TOMM and led to 
varying levels of performance between groups providing different levels of effort. A 
coached feigning group that was informed about the purpose of the measure and 
instructed to perform in a way so as not to get caught faking performed significantly 
worse than groups providing good or adequate effort. This indicated that increasing 
the complexity of a measure of effort such as the TOMM may be a useful strategy for 




decreasing the susceptibility of these measures to coaching attempts. However, 
considerable additional research is needed to assess the functionality of the measure 
with more explicitly coached feigning groups before this can be determined. 
Further research should test this revised measure in various groups of interest, for 
example, groups of individuals with genuine TBI, potential or suspected malingerers, 
groups with psychiatric disorders that may affect level of effort, etc. Testing this 
measure in groups with various neurologic and psychiatric conditions may permit the 
development of cut points that differentiate clinical groups providing good or maximal 
effort, but who perform worse than controls, from those exerting lower levels of effort. 
In addition, future studies should test the measure with a second learning and recall 
trial as well as a retention trial, in accordance with standard administration procedures 
for the original version of the TOMM, to determine if total scores improve after a 
second presentation of the stimuli. It is possible that after a second learning trial, the 
total score for the control group, and possibly other groups, might improve and even 
pass the recommended cutoff score for the original version of the TOMM. However, 
further testing is needed to determine whether certain groups improve their total score 
after a second learning trial or whether they continue to make the same types or 
number of errors. 






Demographics of the Sample by Effort Condition 




Age      
   Mean 19.77 19.93 20.36 19.64 
   SD 1.50 1.33 2.73 0.84 
Race/Ethnicity     
   White 10 12 11 7 
   Black 1 1 1 2 
   Hispanic/Latino 1 0 1 5 
   Asian 1 1 0 0 
   Multiracial 0 0 1 0 
   Other 1 0 0 0 
Gender     
   Female 8 9 8 8 
   Male 5 4 4 6 
   Non-Binary 1 0 1 0 
   Not Reported 0 1 1 0 
Note. The follow-up questionnaire included other demographic options that were not endorsed 
by any participant (Native American was included as an option for race/ethnicity, while Other 
was included as an option for gender). SD = Standard Deviation 





Total Scores on the Revised TOMM by Effort Condition 
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Control  41.50 3.35 36 46 
Intermediate Effort  36.86 5.53 26 45 
Feigning 31.43 7.82 16 40 
Coached Feigning 27.36 7.18 17 41 
Note. SD = Standard Deviation. 





One-Way Analysis of Variance of Revised TOMM Scores by Effort Condition  
  SS  df  MS  F  p  
TOMM      
     Between groups  1607.57  3  535.86  13.88  .000  
     Within groups  2007.86  52  38.61      
     Total  3615.43  55        
Note. SS= sum of squares; df= degrees of freedom; MS= mean square. 
 





Tukey HSD Comparisons of Revised TOMM Scores between Effort Conditions 
    95% Confidence 
Interval 








Control Intermediate Effort 4.64 2.35 -1.59 10.88 
 Feigning 10.07* 2.35 3.84 16.30 
 Coached Feigning 14.14* 2.35 7.91 20.38 
Intermediate  Control -4.64 2.35 -10.88 1.59 
Effort Feigning 5.43 2.35 -0.80 11.66 
 Coached Feigning 9.50* 2.35 3.27 15.73 
Feigning  Control -10.07* 2.35 -16.30 -3.84 
 Intermediate Effort -5.43 2.35 -11.66 0.80 
 Coached Feigning 4.07 2.35 -2.16 10.30 
Coached Control -14.14* 2.35 -20.38 -7.91 
Feigning Intermediate Effort -9.50* 2.35 -15.73 -3.27 
 Feigning -4.07 2.35 -10.30 2.16 
Note. * p < 0.01 





Sums of Types of Error by Effort Condition 













Control  38 37 37 0 6 1 
Intermediate Effort  39 44 58 7 13 13 
Feigning 50 72 80 9 24 25 
Coached Feigning 64 74 82 18 39 40 
Total 191 227 257 34 82 79 
Avg. Number of Errors 19.1 22.7 25.7 5.7 11.7 11.3 
Note. Average Number of Errors was calculated by dividing the total number of errors made 
per type of response option by the number of items of that type. 
 





Error Analysis on A Revised Question with Similar Distractors 




Correct Target 11 10 2 6 
Incorrect 
Similar Distractor 3 2 10 5 
Dissimilar Distractor 0 1 2 3 
Note. Values in cells show how many participants in each group answered the question 
correctly or incorrectly; if they answered incorrectly, it shows what type of error was made.  
 
  





Average Questionnaire Responses by Effort Condition 




Clarity of Instructions 1.64 (1.30) 1.36 (1.08) 1.14 (0.36) 1.86 (1.46) 
Difficulty of Test 3.43 (1.16) 3.21 (1.42) 3.57 (1.22) 4.07 (1.0) 
Perception of Success  6.29 (0.82) 5.0 (1.18) 4.64 (0.84) 5.29 (1.38) 
Note. Values reported are group means with the standard deviations in parentheses. Responses 
were rated on 7-point scales, with clarity of instructions, lower scores indicate greater clarity; 
with difficulty of test higher scores suggest greater perception of difficulty; with perception of 
success higher scores reflect greater perceived success at following task instructions. 
 





Appendix A. Participant Instructions.   
 
Control Group: Please do your best on this test. It is important that you pay close 
attention to the test items and do the best that you can.  
 
Intermediate Effort Group: Take this test as if you are very tired after a long day of 
work or classes and it is a little harder than usual for you to focus. 
 
Feigned Mild TBI Group: Take this test as if you recently suffered a blow to the head 
and sustained a mild head injury or concussion. People with concussions often have 
serious problems with headaches, and with thinking, concentrating, and especially 
remembering things.   
 
Coached Feigning Group: Take this test as if you recently suffered a blow to the head 
and sustained a mild head injury or concussion. People with concussions often have 
serious problems with headaches, and with thinking, concentrating, and especially 
remembering things. However, the measure you are about to take is designed to catch 
people who are trying to fake impairment. You will want to do less than your best, so 
that you do not appear healthy, but avoid doing so poorly that it is obvious you are 
faking. 
 


























How difficult was this test? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very Easy      Very 
Difficult 
 
How clear were the instructions you were given at the start of this study?  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
Clear 
     Not at all 
Clear 
What did the instructions you were given at the start of the study ask you to do? 
• Provide my best effort on this test 
• Take this test as if I was very tired after a long day 
• Fake symptoms of mild traumatic brain injury on this test 
• Fake symptoms of mild traumatic brain injury and avoid being detected as 
faking 
 
How successful do you think you were at following the instructions you were given? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not 
Successful 
     Very 
Successful 
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